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This paper studies the development possibilities of the energy systems of four Central Asia
and Caspian countries. It explores options that improve their domestic energy efficiencies
and increase their export of fossil energy commodities. Using the MARKAL-TIMES model-
ling tool, it represents their energy system with a bottom-up partial economic equilibrium
growth model. With the help of scenario analyses, it evaluates the direct economic
advantage of improving the domestic energy efficiencies. Furthermore it calculates the
direct economic advantage of cooperation. It finds out that a new/different geo-economic
attitude brings USD billions of annual economic benefits, particularly if the countries aim
to differentiate their export routes, increase the amount of export and contribute to
climate change mitigation.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Energy in Central Asia
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan e Central
Asian Caspian countries, CAC e are endowed with abundant energy
resources. In particular Uzbekistan (UZB) and Turkmenistan (TKM) are
rich in natural gas, Azerbaijan (AZJ) oil, Kazakhstan (KZK) oil, coal and
uranium. In 2009, the overall production of the area was around 145
million tonnes (Mt) of crude oil against a consumption of 35.3 Mt, and
around 150 billion cubic meters (Bcm) of natural gas against a con-
sumption of 100 Bcm (Table 1).
About 110 Million tonnes oil equivalent (Mtoe) and 40 Mtoe of nat-
ural gas were exported in 2009, mainly to, or through, the Russian
Federation. If the present status is extrapolated to the future, CAC
countries will not be able to take full advantage of their energy re-
sources, which could be compatible with a large increase of both do-
mestic consumption and exports. Taking full advantage of their future.kz, abakdolo@gmail.com
d. This is an open access article undenergy rents would increase the GDP of the CAC countries and their
economic development prospects much more than at present [1].
The full exploitation of the overall production capacity would make
the Area a “key player” in the fossil fuels export for the next few de-
cades. This calls for the urgent need of investments and the agreement
on a joint energy export-strategy towards external markets as well as
among the Caspian countries themselves. As stated in a special report
[2] by the National Bureau of Asian Research “What we have yet to see
is cooperation among the different players in Central Asia pipelines in
pursuit of convergent objectives, as opposed to competition for
divergent interests.”
This study aims to assess quantitatively the direct economic bene-
fits of cooperation among CAC countries, under different development
and policy assumptions. The evaluation is carried out with the help of
an energy model of the four countries and the CAC area. The TIMES-
CAC-4R model is built with the aim of:
 representing the structure and the mid-long-term development of
the four domestic energy systems at the maximum level of detail
made possible by the available information, with hundreds of
existing and new energy technologies; the models should indicate
the optimal mix of energy resources, the optimal level of in-
vestments in new infrastructures, the desirable level of energy
efficiency in supply and demand, etc.;er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Table 1
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: energy resources and indicators.
Indicators References AZJ KZK TKM UZB Sum China þ India World
Population (million, 2011) [7] 9.1 16.6 5.1 29.3 60 2586 6958
Population density (cap/sqkm) (d) 111 6 11 69 e 144/411 13.5
GDP/capita, 2011 ($’2005ppp/cap) [7] 8.9 11.6 8.3 2.9 6.7 5.4 10.1
Oil rents (þ) (% GDP) (&) [1] 34e62 26e37 16e41 3e10 e e e
Natural gas rents (þ) (% GDP) (&) [1] 3e12 2e8 (^ ) 22e85 15e91 e e e
Energy consumption, 2011 (toe/cap) [7] 1.4 4.7 4.8 1.6 2.7 1.3 1.9
CO2 emissons, 2011 (tco2/cap) [7] 2.9 14 12 3.8 7.2 3.8 4.5
Crude oil (%)
Ultimate recoverable resources (Billion of bbl) [8e10] 15 71 19 3 108 57 3000
Reserves (Billion of bbl) [8e12] 7 35 (*) 0.6 (a) 0.6 43 (*) 35 1480
Domestic consumption (2009, million of bbl/a) [13] 70.8 118 60.0 21.6 270 3770 30,950
Net export (2009, million of bbl/a) [13] 317 449 14.4 e 780 e 0
Natural gas
Ultimate recoverable resources (Tcm) [8e10] 4.5 7.2 11.8c 3.4 26.9 9.4 425
Reserves (Tcm) [8e10] >0.85 >3.5 >7.4 b >1.8 >13.5 3.1 180
Domestic consumption (2009, in Bcm/a) [13] 10.4 20.3 18.0 43.8 92.5 120 3114
Net export (2009, in Bcm/a) [13] 5.8 6.9 19.1 12.7 44.5 e 0
Footnotes: (*) average over the range 30e40 B.bbl found in the literature; (þ) as defined in the WB data base, rents are the difference between the value of oil/natural gas production at
world prices and total costs of production; (&) 2000e2011 range; (^ ) coal rents ranged around 3e9% of GDP; (%) Domestic consumption and net export refer only to crude oil; if oil
products are added, both values are similar to the values shown in the following tables; (a) plus 1.1 B.bbl of proved plus probable reserves in the Caspian Sea [14]; (b) according to BP, the
proven reserves of natural gas in TKM were estimated 24 Tcm at the end of 2011 [11] and 17.5 Tcm at the end of 2012 [12]; (c) according to [15] the ultimate recoverable resources in the
Galkinish-Yolotan fields are 26 Tcm, to make a total for TKM of more than 28 Tcm; (d) 144 relates to China, 411 relates to India.
1 Gas from the transit Countries might sum to the amount from Turkmenistan and
increase the overall export via the Central AsiaeChina corridor.
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flows level among the 4 CAC countries, in order to understand their
optimal level under different development and policy assump-
tions; and
 more specifically exploring some “predefined size” investment
possibilities in oil and gas pipelines.
As far as the authors are aware of, details on consumption by end
use service have never been developed, and are not available in the
literature. Furthermore, there have been no such models so far for the
area and the CAC countries, except Kazakhstan [3].
Previous studies (Bilgin [4], The Regional Environmental Centre
for Central Asia (CAREC) [5], and Babali [6]) focussed on the pros-
pects of alternative energy corridors for the Caspian hydrocarbon
resources and the possible room for cooperation from a geostrategic
point of view and following a “what-if” approach, without any
evaluation of the dynamic domestic energy demands and of the costs
for the energy sector development. This is the first instance that the
Caspian Region energy sector is modelled with detailed representa-
tion of both supply and demand sides (bottom-up approach), and
with the technological descriptions of the existing mix of plants,
demand devices, and industrial chains, in a base year and over 20
years of analysis.
This paper focusses on the potential synergies among the four
Caspian nations in a quantitative manner, with a special focus on the
development of natural gas and crude oil interregional trades. The
second part of Section 1 illustrates the present energy consumption
levels of the four countries. Section 2 outlines the main characteristics
of methods, models and the scenarios, and Section 3 shows some key
results of the analysis.
1.2. Energy trade flows and infrastructures
In the Soviet Union period the Caspian region was able to export
only to the Russian Federation and through the state-controlled Russian
pipelines system, mainly through the Druzhba oil pipeline system and
the Soyuz gas pipeline system. After independence in 1991, Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan partly untied from the Russian Federation. They con-
structed the 1.2 Mbbl/d Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC, from
Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish coast) and the Caspian PipelineCompany’s pipeline (0.7 Mbbl/d) from Atyrau in Kazakhstan to Novor-
ossiysk in Russia. The former allows a complete bypass of the Russian
territory, the latter of the Russian ownership. In 2009 about 80% of the
Kazakh export still passed through the Russian Federation (via Novor-
ossiysk or Samara). Export of Kazakh oil to China started only in 2006,
but with relatively small flows due to capacity limitations in Kazakhstan
e an additional connecting branch needs completion e and in China e
to receive and distribute more oil.
Export of Central Asia’s gas is even more dependent on Russia’s
control. About 90% of the total export of the area went through Russia
until 2009, mainly via the Central AsiaeCentre pipeline system crossing
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (CAC pipeline), with a
combined capacity of 40 Bcm/a. Azerbaijan is the only CAC country
that can export natural gas independently from the Russian Federation,
through Turkey via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), up to a maximum
volume of 6.5 Bcm/a. Recently the Central Asia e China gas pipeline
started bringing Central Asian natural gas to East, highlighting China’s
interest for Central Asian energy resources1.
2. Method: model and scenario analysis
2.1. Modelling approach
This scenario analysis uses an integrated 4-region energy model of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, called TIMES-
CAC-4R. This bottom up technical-economic partial equilibrium
model is built using the TIMESmodel generator developed by the Energy
Technology Systems Analysis Program of the International Energy
Agency [16].
The key-components of the single-region national TIMES models are
the technologies for the production of primary and secondary com-
modities (supply side) together with the most representative appli-
ances and devices of the demand sectors. Each model represents
separately about 30 demand sectors, as many as shown in the con-
sumption part of the national balances. The main demand drivers,
along with the resulting projection of the weighted aggregate demand
Table 2
Technical-economic characterisation of the main renewable sources for electricity
generation.
Investment cost in 2030 Technical potential in 2030 (in GW)
In CAC
(US$’2000ppp/kW)
AZJ KZK TKM UZB
Hydro 1500e5000 (*) Limited,
unexploited
6 Limited Limited,
unexploited
Wind 1800 Negligible 25 (^ ) 10 negligible
Solar 1800e2200 (þ) unlimited in the model
Geo e not available in the model till 2030
Footnotes: (*) the range reflects the site dependency of costs, for both impoundment and
run of the river plants; (þ) the two extremes of the range refer to centralised and
distributed systems; (^ ) up to 350 GW in the long term according to the Wind Atlas of
Kazakhstan [18].
Table 3
Major development drivers and aggregate demand indexes.
Indicator Values In 2009 Growth index (2009 ¼ 100)
2020 2025 2030
AZJ Population Million 8.8 118 124 130
GDP per capita (&) US$’2000 ppp 8702 175 217 251
Aggregate demand
for energy services
Index (þ) 100 199 265 328
KZK Population Million 15.9 118 124 130
GDP per capita (&) US$’2000 ppp 8400 161 196 238
Aggregate demand
for energy services
Index (þ) 100 167 209 264
TKM Population Million 5.1 118 124 130
GDP per capita (&) US$’2000 ppp 9859 175 217 251
Aggregate demand
for energy services
Index (þ) 100 179 226 269
UZB Population Million 27.8 118 124 130
GDP per capita (&) US$’2000 ppp 2395 175 217 251
Aggregate demand
for energy services
Index (þ) 100 185 238 283
CAC Population Million 57.6 118 124 130
GDP per capita (&) US$’2000 ppp 5678 170 208 246
Aggregate demand
for energy services
Index (þ) 100 178 226 278
Footnotes: (*) indexes are equal to 100 in the base year, 2009; (&) Source: IEA [19] (þ) the
growth of the 30e35 separate demands, which can be tons of cement or passenger *
kilometres, are averaged using as weights their final energy consumption in the base
year.
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service demands are expected to increase the consumption of oil
products and natural gas up to 3e4 folds by 2030.
The time horizon of the models is 2050, but it is flexible and can be
used for analysis in the medium term (until 2020 or 2030). Each single
country model can run in a standalone mode.
In each country model domestic fossil energy resources e as shown
in Table 1 e are available to supply3:
 the endogenous level of trade among the 4 CAC countries, and
 the exogenous levels of export to the rest of the world.
The technical potential and the investment cost of hydro, wind,
solar PV and geothermal in the four single region models are reported in
Table 2. For hydro, due to the limited potential, an almost flat upper
bound is set in the model for all the countries. For wind, an almost flat
upper bound of a few MW is set in the AZJ and UZB country models, due
to their limited potential; the energy systems of KZK and TKM are
allowed to use wind power up to their bounds on the basis of an eco-
nomic competitiveness criterion. Since the potential for solar energy is
huge in the four countries, the models do not impose upper limits: the
use of solar is decided only on economic competitiveness basis. In this
version of the models run to 2030, geothermal is not included, although
UZB has a strong potential and TKM a moderate one.
The 4-region TIMES-CAC-4R model represents the Central Asian-
Caspian energy system. It assembles the 4 separate but structurally
consistent single-region TIMES country models by interconnecting them
with endogenous trade infrastructures, energy flows and emission
permits4. In other words in this model the resources of each country can
be traded endogenously with all the other CAC countries. In the base
year import and export flows through the existing infrastructure are
reproduced by the model for each country.
The model includes the possibility to build new infrastructures, as
listed in Table 4, and increase the exchanges within the CAC area and
the export to external markets. In particular, the Trans-Caspian Oil
Transport System is a proposed project to transport oil through the
Caspian Sea from Kazakhstani Caspian oilfields to Baku in Azerbaijan for2 These projections are not forecasts, but rather instruments used to carry out
quantitative scenario analyses.
3 The possibility to increase supplies in the first few years is limited in order to wait
for the new extraction infrastructure to be build. For instance in the years 2015e2020
the extraction of natural gas is limited to 850 Bcf in AZJ, 3000 Bcf in TKM, and to very
little growths over the base year values are permitted in UZB.
4 Data about existing, under construction, and planned infrastructure projects, in-
formation about bilateral agreements on energy issues, criticalities of export routes,
geopolitical and geostrategic overviews of the Area and of the players are taken from
Refs. [5, 22e26].the further transportation to the Mediterranean or Black Sea coast. The
main options under consideration are an offshore oil pipeline from
Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan5, and construction of oil terminals and an oil
tankers fleet6. New natural gas infrastructures are allowed to be built
to increase the capacities of existing corridors with parallel lines (TKM-
China, TKM-Russian Federation) or to open new and alternative energy
corridors (Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline TKM-AZJ). The level of capacity
and its flows are fully endogenous. Investments in new trade-capacities
are allowed starting from 2015.
This particular model makes use of the “lumpy investment variant”
of TIMES7. Since pipelines have to be built with a predefined capacity,
the variable representing them in the TIMES-CAC-4R model cannot be
continuous as in normal LP models. They are declared as integer: the
model can choose among 3 or more capacities when a new pipeline is
necessary8.
Integer variables represent new investments in trade in-
frastructures: four “unidirectional” cross-regional trades of natural gas
and three “unidirectional” cross-regional trades of oil. The main
technical economic characteristics of each trade connection are re-
ported in Table 4.
Linear variables represent four “bidirectional” cross-regional trades
of electricity and two unidirectional cross-regional trades of coal. Coal
for power plants is exported from KZK to TKM at a price of 53 $’2000/t
corresponding to a distance of about 3000 km and to UZB at a price of 45
$’2000/t corresponding to a distance of 2000 km. For smaller con-
sumers the price is 1.5 times higher. Building new high voltage lines to5 The construction of this pipeline is facing the opposition of the Russian Federation
and Iran, officially related to the legal status of the basin.
6 A strong push for the project has come from the partners of the Kashagan oilfield
project and in particular TOTAL who has a share in both the field and the BTC pipeline.
Apparently, KZK already started to transport oil from Tengiz via tankers across Caspian.
7 This model variant is explained in TIMES Documentation, PART I, chapter 7 [16].
8 The TIMES-CAC-4R model is solved using the mixed-integer-linear programming
(MILP) option of the CPLEX solver of ILOG. The model has about 164,000 equations,
195,000 variables and one million non-zero elements. The linear variant solves in a
minute or two in a work station. Having about 50 integer variables, multiplies the so-
lution time by a factor of 3e4.
Table 4
New possible pipelines: main characteristics in the TIMES-CAC-4R model.
Main characterisation parameters (*) (**)/:
New oil pipelines, among the 4 CAC countries (þ)
Approx.
length, km
Capacities
(M. bbl/day)
Investment cost
M$’2000/(PJ/a)
Annual flows PJ/a Var.O&M cost
M$’2000/PJ
KZK-TKM 700 0.05/0.1/0.24 8/12/16 100/200/500 1
KZK-UZB 500 0.1/0.2/0.5 6/10/14 200/400/1000 1
Non-CAC transit Countries (þþ)
New oil pipelines, with the rest of the world
KZK-MED sea, via AZJ (^ ) (&) GEO, TUR 1500 0.24/0.72/1.2 18/22/26 480/1440/2400 1
New gas pipelines with the rest of the world (Bcm/a)
TKM-RF, through KZK RF, UKR/BLR 2000 28.5/51.5/80 16/20/24 1000/1800/2800 4
TKM-CHI, through UZB/KZK e 1500 24.5/30/35 16/20/24 850/1050/1250 3
TKM-CHI, through UZB/TJK/KYR TAJ, KYR 1500 14/23/28.5 16/20/24 500/800/1000 3
TKM-MED sea, through AZJ GEO, TUR 1^500 5.5/8.5/20 18/22/26 200/300/700 6
Footnotes: (*): Start year ¼ 2015, Lifetime ¼ 40y, Fixed O&M ¼ 5% of the investment cost, own consumption: 0.9% for gas pipelines, 0.5% for oil pipelines; (**) data from Refs. [20]; (þ):
CAC ¼ Central Asia Caspian, AZJ ¼ Azerbaijan, KZK ¼ Kazakhstan, TKM ¼ Turkmenistan, UZB ¼ Uzbekistan; (þþ): BLR ¼ Bielarus, CHI ¼ China, GEO ¼ Georgia, KYR ¼ Kyrgyzstan,
RF¼ Russian Federation, TAJ¼ Tajikistan, TUR¼ Trurkey, UKR¼ Ukraine;^under the Caspian sea; it refers to the offshore oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan; & associated with
the possible expansion of the BakueTbilisieCeyhan pipeline (BTC) 0.5 M.bbl/d.
Table 5
Scenarios list and code names.
Drivers Emission limits High export increase
No Yes To West,
via Russia
To West, via
Mediterranean Sea
Cooperative Ref Ref_Emi WRF_HE WMS_HE
Non-cooperative Ref_NC Ref_Emi_NC WRF_HE_NC Infeasible
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in the model of 740 M$’2000/GW, an efficiency of 96% and a fixed
operation and maintenance cost of 7.4 M$’2000/GW9.
2.2. Projection drivers and scenario assumptions
In this study the scenarios are meant to explore the direct economic
advantage of cooperation policies in the energy and climate change
mitigation sectors. The following cooperation policies in the area are
directly modelled:
 exploitation of Caspian oil and natural gas resources;
 investment in the construction of new pipelines;
 maintenance of free exchange in the energy sector; and
 creation of a joint CO2 emission permit system in the CAC area.
Different cooperation levels are tested. In the most cooperative
scenarios, a new geo-economic attitude prevails in governments, not
only in energy companies: the four countries agree among each other
and with their neighbours in order to maximise the economic benefit of
their large energy resources, by making them available to a much
higher but still feasible level. This situation is modelled by making it
possible to exploit Caspian oil and natural gas resources to their
maximum technical availability. The number and size of new in-
frastructures is open to several possibilities, all of them with a cost of
capital as low as the general discount rate, 5%. The level of customs
duties across the four countries remains zero. In the field of climate
change mitigation policy, the four countries decide to cooperate and9 These average values are based on power system consideration and statistical data,
assuming as a reference a 500 kV overhead transmission line of 1000 km with an overall
cost of US$ 270 million or, a 500 kV undersea transmission line of 300 km at the same
cost.
10 International emission trading mechanisms, including Countries outside the borders
of the CAC region, have not been taken into account in order to highlight the room of
cooperation within the Area.open some sort of Emission Trading Scheme10, in order to make it
cheaper to achieve themitigation objective of Kazakhstan, which is the
only Annex I country in CAC with binding commitments11.
At the other extreme, short sighted nationalistic policies prevail:
national interests prevent the development of the two new large sub-
sea trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines; the remaining ones incur higher
capital costs, with interest rates increasing up to 20% in 2030. Also the
amount of low cost coal exported from KZK to UZB and TKM is reduced
to zero and the construction of new power transmission lines banned.
Furthermore, the Caspian disputes extend the uncertainties and
reduce foreign investments on the development of important fields,
with the effect of halving future extraction levels from new Caspian
Sea fields. KZK is also assumed to comply with its mitigation commit-
ments without the possibility to buy permits from the neighbouring CAC
countries.
Total revenues will be exogenously calculated by assuming export
prices (see Table 6), while the costs of the optimal configuration of the
CAC system (new energy and technology mix to meet the additional
export in the time horizon) will be completely endogenous. The direct
economic value of cooperation (extra revenues minus extra costs) in
the energy sector is evaluated and quantified by exploring different
development possibilities as to12:
 amount of export,
 directions of export, and
 climate change mitigation commitments (of Kazakhstan).
The first driver is explored considering three oil and gas export
levels:
 base: constant to the 2009 level of about 110 Mtoe of crude oil and
about 40 Mtoe of natural gas;
 mid: natural gas increasing in 2030 by 42 Bcm/a and crude oil by
50 Mt/a above the base13; and
 max: natural gas increasing in 2030 by 62 Bcm/a and crude oil by
55 Mt/a above the base (HE).11 For more info on the Kazakh climate change mitigation commitments and plans, see
for instance [27].
12 The cooperative/non-cooperative approaches are designed on the basis of the
decision-science technique (mathematical programming) used for representing and
solving the decision problem, which is characterized by a mono-objective function to
optimize. A game-theory based analysis, multi-players and multi-objectives, aiming at
identifying the most stable coalitions among the four countries, will be performed later
for a comparative study.
13 The mid export level case is not reported here.
Table 6
High export levels (HE) and possible revenues of the CAC region.
Unit revenue (*) Unit (þ) China Russia Europe Total Unit (þ) China Russia Europe Total
Expressed in $/bbl 70 40 100 $/000 cm 175 70 280
Max export scenario of Crude oil Natural gas
To West-Russia
Export levels (^ ) Mbbl/d 0.15 0.95 0.00 1.10 Bcm/a 0 62.4 0 62.4
Revenues $ Bill 3.9 13.8 0.0 17.7 $ Bill 0 4.4 0 4.4
To West-Mediterranean Sea
Export levels (^ ) Mbbl/d 0.15 0.42 0.53 1.10 Bcm/a 42.9 0 19.5 62.4
Revenues $ Bill 3.9 6.1 19.2 29.3 $ Bill 7.5 0 5.5 13.0
Footnotes: (*) although used to build an example, these unit revenues are compatible with some market prices in recent years [21]; (þ) $ means here USD constant of the year 2000; (^ )
amount of export in 2030 additional to the 2009 levels.
Table 7
New pipelines capacity endogenously built by the model by scenario (in PJ/a).
Pipeline WRF WMS
Name 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Direct gas export from AZJ to Med 343 355 355
Direct oil export from AZJ to Med 600 600 600
Direct oil export from KZK to China 322 322 322
Direct oil export from KZK to Russia 1540 1760 1980 880 880 880
Direct gas export from KZK to Russia 1140 1222 1310
Gas export UZB-KZK (to Russia, 200) 2*200 2*200 2*200
Gas export UZB-KZK (to Russia, 300) 1*300 1*300
Gas export TKM-KZK (to Russia, 1000) 0 0 1*1000
Gas export TKM-AZJ (to Med, 200) 1*200 1*200 2*200
Gas export TKM-UZB-KZK
(to China, 850)
2*850 2*850 2*850
Oil export KZK-AZJ (to Med, 500) 1*500 1*500 2*500
R. De Miglio et al. / Energy Strategy Reviews 4 (2014) 52e6056In order to assess the effect of increasing export in different di-
rections, four alternative cases have been prepared: West through
Russia using the Gazprom system (WRF), West through Azerbaijan to
the Mediterranean Sea (WMS), East to China (CHI), and South to Iran
(IRA)14. Fig. 1 displays the preferential “exit points” at the border of
the TIMES-CAC-4R model area.
The climate change mitigation driver is explored by limiting the
emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) from the energy systems. In the
base case, without mitigation policies, KZK increases its CO2 emissions
from the energy system from 238 MtCO2eq/a in 2009 to 456 MtCO2eq/a
in 2030, and the four countries together increase the sum of their CO2
emissions from 483 MtCO2eq/a in 2009 to 921 MtCO2eq/a in 2030. In the
mitigation scenarios (Emi), CO2 emissions of the four energy systems
together have to be limited to 670 MtCO2eq/a in 2030. In the cooper-
ative case, KZK can purchase emission permits from the neighbours,
and reduces its domestic emissions to 349 MtCO2eq/a in 2030; in the
non-cooperative case, KZK has to reduce its domestic emissions down
to 245 MtCO2eq/a in 2030, while the other three countries don’t have
any commitment and emit the complement to 670 MtCO2eq/a in 2030.
The two scenarios differ by the possibility or not for KZK to buy permits
from neighbouring countries.
This paper briefly discusses only the seven scenarios listed in
Table 5.
3. Scenario results
3.1. A stationary export case
Assuming that the four countries develop with the present economic
trend (see Table 3), if the 2009 level of oil and gas export remains
constant through 2030, the total discounted system extra-cost15 of non-
cooperation (case Ref_NC) is about 2.3 billion USD2000, which is less of
0.2% of the total discounted value of the four energy systems from 2010
to 2030. The main looser in this case is UZB, which bears almost the
entire losses of the four countries; it suffers extra-costs of about 1% of
its total annual energy system cost, corresponding to about 0.5 billion
USD2000 towards the end of the twenties.
Since UZB is tight in conventional oil and gas domestic resources, by
2030 it fully exploits its conventional oil resources and almost all its
conventional natural gas resources already in the reference case. In the
non-cooperative scenarios access to capital becomes more difficult and
the amount of domestic oil and gas supply reduces below the levels
needed to satisfy its growing demand for energy services in 2030.
In the case of natural gas, the gap cannot be filled by import since
gas pipelines do not exist and cannot be built due to non-cooperation.
The domestic consumption system shifts slightly from natural gas to14 In fact the third (CHI) and fourth (IRA) alternative routes are not reported here.
15 This total discounted cost, as well as all the others referred to in this paper, refers
to the periods 2010-2030 and is discounted with a discount rate of 5% in real terms.coal where possible, like for instance in commercial space heating.
Energy efficiency improvement is the solution in all other sectors:
losses are reduced in the transport and distribution system of natural
gas, electricity and district heat; better and new technologies are used
in plants and demand devices (Fig. 2a). Prices increase (Fig. 2b, c) to
the level that makes competitive the more efficient processes. As a
result, the TPES needed in 2030 to satisfy the same demand for energy
services reduce by 2.7%. In the case of oil, the gap is filled by importing
crude from KZK to the maximum levels permitted by the existing
pipeline, at a cost higher than in the reference case, because KZK
imposes export duties (Fig. 2b, c). The amount of oil products used by
final consumers does not change.
3.2. Increased export of oil and gas
Oil and natural gas industry contributes more to the growth of the
domestic economies of the CAC countries if export increases to high but
still reasonable levels (Table 6). For example, with unit revenues as
exemplified in the above table, the total revenues of CAC countries
exporting crude oil and natural gas could increase by more than 22
billion USD2000 (sum of crude oil þ natural gas). If the preferential
export routes to the Russian Federation are maintained, the direct
annual cost of increasing export is 12 billion USD2000 for KZK, 2.5 billion
USD2000 for UZB and 0.7 billion USD2000 for TKM, for a total of about 15
billion USD2000 per year in the twenties.
At such high export levels (HE) the cost of non-cooperation is higher
than in the stationary case. Maintaining the preferential export routes
to the Russian Federation till 2030, the total CAC discounted system
extra-cost of non-cooperation (WRF_HE_NC) increases to more than 10
billion USD2000. In the twenties the average annual extra-cost is aboutOil export KZK-UZB (200) 1*200 1*200 1*200 2*200
Footnotes: Direct exports have been modelled with “linear” decision variables, Cross-
Country infrastructures with integer decision variables, whose size is specified in
brackets.
Fig. 1. Three alternative export routes from Caspian Region; a) To the West via Russian
Federation (WRF); b) To the West via Mediterranean Sea (WMS); c) To the East to China
(ECH).
16 Any Trans-Caspian project would probably face the “indirect” risk of worsening
relations with Russia.
17 Technically, non-cooperative scenarios of increased export to the EU alternative to
the Russian Federation routes are ‘infeasible’.
18 Oil and gas export from CAC to China can be increased to a mid-level, but not to the
economic potential (high export levels used in the cooperative scenarios with exports to
the Russian Federation or the Mediterranean Sea) if the countries do not cooperate. In
the mid-level oil and gas export case, the lack of cooperation increases the total dis-
counted system cost of the area by more than 100 USD2000. Two third of the burden is
borne by AZJ with annual extra cost of almost 10 USD2000, one third by KZK with about 5
USD2000.
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both countries this extra-cost is 1.4% of the total discounted domestic
energy system cost. The extra cost in KZK is due to the increase of oil
extractions needed to meeting the additional demand of the market
across the Russian oil pipeline system, and to more investments in
energy efficiency needed to reduce domestic consumption and main-
tain the same export level. The extra cost in TKM is spent in extracting
more natural gas to be sent to KZK and Russia through a new cross-
country pipeline with a capacity of 30 Bcm/a, and substituting the
lower import from UZB (Fig. 3). Thus in 2030, 100% of the oil export
increase is covered by KZK, and 28% of the natural gas additional de-
mand is covered by TKM.
3.3. New directions of export
If they cooperate, CAC countries can build an export route sup-
plemental to the existing ones, through Georgia, Turkey and theMediterranean Sea, and export higher but still reasonable levels of oil
and natural gas (Table 6). Exporting higher amounts directly to Europe
could be more economically profitable than continuing with the
existing routes and less exposed to direct16 socio-political transit
country risks. With the indicative price assumptions of Table 6 the extra
revenues would be of the order of 20 billion USD2000. With the as-
sumptions used in this study, reaching this objective would imply
annual average extra-cost of 12 billion USD2000 in the twenties. The
capacity of existing corridors would be increased and new pipelines
built (Table 7), and the CAC domestic energy systems should be
adapted, in particular in AZJ (Fig. 4).
Non-cooperation has the direct effect of preventing the exploita-
tion of Caspian offshore fields and the construction of sub-sea Caspian
pipelines. In other words export from CAC to Europe via Turkey and the
Mediterranean Sea cannot be increased much in the non-cooperative
scenarios17, since without the amount of oil and gas coming from the
other three CAC countries, AZJ cannot increase its export and feed its
increasing energy consumption at the same time, also because coal
cannot be imported from KZK and electricity from the others18.3.4. Climate change mitigation commitments of KZK
Among the four CAC countries, only KZK committed to adopt
climate change mitigation policies. No decisions have been taken
beyond 2020; in this study we assume that GHG emissions from the
energy system of KZK stabilise after 2020 to the 2010 levels (Fig. 5,
scenario Ref_Emi_NC). Summing up the emissions of the other three
countries, which are not committed to any limitation, a total of about
670 MtCO2eq is emitted by CAC countries in 2030. If the same limitation
is applied to the four CAC countries together, KZK reduces its domestic
effort and still achieves its commitments by purchasing quite sub-
stantial emission permits from the neighbours.
Assuming that the amount and direction of oil and gas export remain
the same as in 2009, even a severe climate change mitigation policy by
KZK looks affordable if it can trade emission permits with the AZJ, TKM
and UZB. By comparing scenarios Ref and Ref_Emi, the total discounted
system extra cost of mitigation would be about 15 billion USD2000, of
which 11 billion USD2000 spent in KZK domestic policies and measure.
The rest is the annual cost for purchasing emission permits from AZJ,
TKM and UZB, for 0.2 billion USD2000, 0.3 billion USD2000 and 0.7
billion USD2000 respectively in 2030. In this winewin scenario KZK
would provide funds for energy efficiency improvements of the four
CAC countries (Fig. 5a).
In KZK the extra cost of 0.5 billion USD2000 in 2025 and 4 billion
USD2000 for mitigation in 2030 is made up mostly of additional in-
vestments in the generation side where new oil and gas fired plants
replace some old coal-fired units (Fig. 6a); additionally in the resi-
dential and tertiary sectors new end-use devices are used which reduce
the consumption of coal and increase the use of natural gas up to 15% in
the total final consumption.
If the neighbouring CAC countries do not cooperate, and KZK aims to
achieve the same emission limitation and reduction targets to 2030,
comparing scenarios Ref and Ref_Emi_NC, the total system extra-cost
Fig. 2. a) Total primary energy supply (TPES) in Uzbekistan; b) and c) Energy prices in the Reference (REF) and Non-cooperative Reference (REF-NC) scenarios for all countries of the
CAC region.
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annual extra cost for the KZK energy system would be about 1 billion
USD2000 in 2020, 4 billion USD2000 in 2025, and 9 billion USD2000 in
2030, mainly in investments for low/no carbon technologies19. The cost
is duemainly to the purchase and use of more efficient end use devices,
which reduce the amount of final energy consumed to satisfy demands
for energy services equal to the reference scenarios (Fig. 6b).
4. Discussions
The method of technical-economic growth models used in this pa-
per assumes perfect markets. The results portray ideal system de-
velopments and identify ‘optimal’ decision strategies. However,
particularly in the field of energy, mono/oligo-polistic and mono/oligo-
psonistic behaviours determine sub-optimal decisions. Therefore the
indications resulting from analyses of the type illustrated in this paper
need further checking. In any case, the investment decisions suggested
by model results need detailed Cost Benefit Analyses and multi-criteria
assessment.
Many assumptions were necessary in order to represent the CAC
country in energy systems models. The energy flow and technology
stock data in the calibration look realistic, although far from certainty.
The development assumptions are intermediate among the set of
assumption found in the literature. Particular care has been used to
keep realistic the energy export scenario assumptions.
The models have been always used within a range not too far from
the base growth path: scenarios with unrealistic marginal prices have19 The cost of mitigation increases if more oil and gas are exported (high export in-
crease). In these cases less natural gas is available for domestic consumption, and more
no/low carbon technologies have to be used, renewables sources and highly efficient
plants and processes. In the non-cooperative scenarios, the corresponding cost of
mitigation becomes 4-5 higher than the corresponding cooperation scenario, since
natural gas is even scarcer.been rejected. In this paper we prefer to show results which relate to
differences among scenarios because they are much more robust than
absolute values related to a single scenario.
Although using a different regional coverage and an economic
approach extending to socio-political aspects, CAREC [5] posts in-
vestment figures of the same order of magnitude of the present
studies. However the direct economic benefits illustrated in this
paper are not simply calculated by subtracting to the revenues of oil
and gas export the cost of supplying them. This paper takes a system
approach and accounts also for the feedbacks to different policies:
it includes in the evaluation the total costs of developing the do-
mestic energy systems, from mining to end uses, given a set of as-
sumptions on the availability of energy resources and future
developments of demands for energy services. It shows the strength
of carrying out energy policy evaluations using the approach of
systems analysis and bottom-up technical-economic partial equi-
librium growth models.
The method used in this paper calculates the direct economic
benefits and cost of the energy systems. The actual economic benefits
for the countries are much higher than the direct revenues from oil and
gas export. Their estimate requires the use of appropriate consumer’s
and producer’s multipliers, or even better the use of general equilib-
rium growth models.
Better evaluations will be carried out in the future when the TIMES-
CAC model will include more technological options; for instance adding
a finer definition of time slices to represent electricity and hydro-
electric rich countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the electricity
trade pattern will become more realistic. Adding as separate regions
the big surrounding countries e such as China, India, the Russian
Federation and the Western European countries e will make export
routes endogenous model variables and provide better results. A
further step could be to switch to the general equilibrium version of
TIMES, and/or to solve the decision problem making use of a game
theory approach.
Fig. 3. Origin of the natural gas exported from the CAC Area, by year and scenario.
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This analysis of four Central Asian Caspian countries e Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan e and their energy systems
assumes that their transition towards a market economy continues and
completes by 2030. With this assumption, the use of technical-
economic equilibrium growth models underlines the importance ofFig. 4. Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) of Azerb
Fig. 5. a) GHG emissions of CAC Area by Country and scenario;policies that achieve two objectives: the energy efficiency of the do-
mestic systems and the maximum cooperation among the four
countries.
The efficiency of the CAC energy system could increase from 51% in
2009 to 67% in 2030 if optimal investments and development strategies
will be implemented. This would bring the efficiency of the system
close to the present average global level of 68%. Moving in this directionaijan (AZJ) by year, energy form, and scenario.
b) Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) of CAC Area by fuel.
Fig. 6. a) Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) of Kazakhstan by energy form and scenario; b) Total Final Consumption (TFC) of Kazakhstan by scenario and demand sector.
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would reduce of about 10 billion USD2000 per year in the period
2025e30.
Cooperation could bring similar if not higher benefits. At present the
cooperation level among AZJ, KZK, TKM and UZB is not optimal due to
unresolved issues related to the exploitation of Caspian crude oil and
natural gas resources and the difficulty to agree on investments in the
construction of new pipelines. In the future, nationalistic policies could
worsen the situation and arrive to impose barriers to the free exchange
of energy commodities. This study shows that cooperation among AZJ,
KZK, TKM and UZB in the field of energy at large produces direct eco-
nomic benefits20 to the area under a wide range of scenario
assumptions.
If no new policies are undertaken and crude oil and natural gas
export remain constant at the 2009 level/directions till 2030 (station-
ary export case), the direct economic benefits of cooperation range
around 0.5 billion USD2000 annually in the twenties. The direct eco-
nomic benefits of cooperation increase if new policies are undertaken.
If the CAC countries increase their 2009 export level by 1.1 Mbbl/
d of crude oil and 62 Bcm/a of natural gas (2300 PJ/a and 2200 PJ/a
respectively), but maintain the same preferential export routes to the
Russian Federation, the direct economic benefit of cooperation is in
about 1.5 billion USD2000 per year in the twenties. Without coopera-
tion, if the same export increase is preferentially conveyed to Western
Europe through Georgia, Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea, the direct
economic benefit is about 8 billion USD2000 annually in the twenties.
Without cooperation such option could not be implemented.
Eventually, if KZK wants to implement a strong mitigation policy and
keep its GHG emissions from the energy system constant to the 2010
level of about 240 MtCO2eq till 2030 the cooperation with the other
CAC countries would reduce the Kazakh mitigation cost of 4e5 billion
USD2000 annually in the period 2025e30.
The quantitative evaluations of the direct economic benefits of
cooperation among CAC countries reported in this paper are based on a
lot of assumptions about their present energy supply and demand
systems. If in the future the countries will collect more and more
detailed primary statistical data and make them more reliable through
better and more detailed energy balances, less assumptions will be
necessary, better model will be built and more reliable evaluations will
be obtained.20 The actual economic benefits for the countries would be much higher than the
direct revenues from oil and gas export and should be estimated with the use of
appropriate consumer’s and producer’s multipliers.References
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